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THE COHORT BORN IN THE TWO DECADES following WWII now straddles
the traditional age 65 threshold between work and retirement. By 2030 all
“boomers” will be over age 65; some will have died but, given present life
expectancy, the majority will be alive, at an average age of about 75. This age
is often used to mark entry into the “frail elderly” stage of life, at which aver-
age per capita health costs rise precipitously. Some fraction of their frail eld-
erly health costs will be borne privately and that fraction may become the
subject of an intergenerational political debate. Given a high level of public
commitment to public health insurance across most OECD countries –
including Canada – it seems reasonable to conclude that most costs will be
assumed publicly. Contending with a looming rise in health care costs is one
1 I thank Greg Marchildon, Fred Gorbet and Russ Robinson for comments on ear-
lier drafts, and Nancy Olewiler for educating me on aspects of carbon pricing.
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of the major fiscal dilemmas facing OECD member states.
Among the necessary – if far from sufficient – responses to global warming
is to price greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. According to the National
Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, the price in Canada
should ramp up over the coming decade to $100/tonne of CO2 equivalent by
2020, and to $200/tonne by 2025 (NRTEE 2009). International experience
with emissions markets as tactic to price emissions has been disappointing.
Increasingly, attention is turning to the administratively simpler option of car-
bon taxes. That implies an ambitious and controversial reorganization of the
tax system.
Beyond the fact that boomers’ frail elderly health status and global warming
are future events whose costs will emerge incrementally and that effective pol-
icy entails short-term political controversy that politicians are loath to incur,
these appear to be entirely separable policy concerns. Is there a policy link to
be made between them? Maybe …
The chapter proceeds as follows. First is a section making the case that,
given the magnitude of projected frail elderly health costs for the boomer
cohort in Canada, prefunding a portion of the cost is desirable. There follows
a discussion of the extent of popular opposition to increased taxing effort. It is
profound. The final section suggests linking a campaign for prefunding to a
campaign for a carbon tax.
The Case for Prefunding Frail Elderly Care of Baby 
Boomers
Voter attitudes act as an ill-defined constraint on size of government. More
on that theme later. A more explicitly defined constraint is financial market
interpretation of voters’ willingness to pay the taxes required to finance exist-
ing programs and redeem outstanding sovereign debt. In the 1990s, market
scepticism played a powerful role in persuading Canadian politicians to under-
take fiscal redress, and persuading voters to accept it.
There are long lags in the dynamics whereby fiscal credibility of govern-
ments is either created or lost. The roots of the loss of fiscal credibility in Can-
ada in the 1990s lay in political decisions taken in the 1960s and 1970s, when
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quately revising their willingness to pay taxes. Distracted by recessions in the
early 1980s and early 1990s and by two prolonged and complex constitutional
conflicts – which order of government has the better claim to resource rents,
whether Quebec would stay within the federation – both orders of govern-
ment long resisted redesign of their respective social programs and the
increased taxing effort required to accord them fiscal credibility. Instead,
Ottawa accused the provinces of moral hazard in designing inefficient social
programs whose basic goal was to maximize federal spending under cost-shar-
ing agreements. Such programs, Ottawa argued, obeyed the letter but not the
spirit of the agreements. In turn, the provinces accused Ottawa of addressing
its deficit by unilateral changes to regulations governing intergovernmental
transfers and federal social programs, the effect of which was to oblige the
provinces to increase spending in social policy ministries and incur larger def-
icits.
Applying the C/QPP precedent
In the mid-1990s, finally, both orders of government did redesign many of
their respective programs and increase taxing effort. Among the major federal
initiatives was a restoration of actuarial credibility to the funding strategy for
the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP). It required a near doubling of the
earmarked payroll tax. The actuarial modeling undertaken prior to the pro-
gram’s launch in mid-1960s extrapolated post-WWII fertility rates, contem-
porary life expectancy after age 60 and then-prevailing labour productivity
increases. Hence, the program did not incorporate the post-1960s fertility
decline, productivity growth decline, increases in life expectancy and age-
related medical expenses. Nor did it adequately incorporate the decline in
average retirement age. Extrapolation of pre-reform tax rates implied exhaus-
tion of the reserve fund within two decades and, thereafter complete reliance
on a rising pay-as-you-go payroll tax (Department of Finance, 2007). The
present partially pre-funded C/QPP design entails two central features: a pay-
roll tax rate sufficiently high that it is expected to be constant over the next 75
years, and a reserve fund target. The payroll tax rate has been set (at 9.9 per230 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
cent) so as to permit the reserve fund to stabilize at approximately five times
annual expenditures over the next 75 years.2
The reform improved intergenerational equity: it required those in the
labour force to pay a higher share of their expected future benefits. It also
improved long-term efficiency of the tax system by lowering what would oth-
erwise be required marginal tax rates on labour income in future decades.
Based on this precedent, Bill Robson (2010) undertook an exercise in ana-
lyzing the levelized incremental taxing effort required over the next half cen-
tury to accommodate publicly assumed frail elderly health costs for the
boomer cohort. He projected core social program costs (health, education,
elderly transfers and child/family benefits) over the next half century, using
“middle-of-the-road” assumptions: a constant fertility rate, employment rate
at pre-recession levels, an annual increase in labour productivity of 1.75 per
cent, life expectancy rising according to Statistics Canada’s “medium” case,
and extrapolation of present per student labour inputs for education costs and
of present per capita labour inputs for eight age- and sex-specific groups in the
case of provincial health costs. Under these assumptions, the total cost of these
four services rises from under 16.5 per cent of 2011 GDP to 20.9 per cent of
2031 GDP, and 23.5 per cent of 2051 GDP.
Virtually all of this increase is due to projected increases in the age 60 and
over share of the population and the consequent rise in public health care
costs. Charts 1 and 2 help explain why the projected increase is so large. Chart
1 illustrates average per capita provincial expenditures. The overall 2008 aver-
age was $3,350; for those age 75 and over they exceed $10,000. Chart 2 illus-
trates the 2008 distributions by age cohorts of the Canadian population and of
provincial health expenditures. Cohort-specific average expenditures are
below the overall average for cohorts over age 1 and below age 60; they rise
above it for older cohorts.3 Cumulative statistics indicate the extent to which
health expenditures are skewed to older cohorts. In 2008, the 81 per cent of
the population below age 60 and the 19 per cent of the population age 60 and
2 See Department of Finance (2007) for a summary of the actuarial exercise
underlying mid-1990s CPP reform.
3 The two distributions cross at the age 55-59 cohort. Members of that cohort
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Per Capita Provincial Health Expenditures, by Age Cohorts, 2008
Source: CIHI (2010).232 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
over each accounted for 50 per cent of health expenditures; the 6 per cent age
75 and over accounted for 29 per cent of expenditures.
Applying the C/QPP partial pre-funding precedent, Robson estimated the
increase in taxing effort required to honour the implicit social contract of
present age-specific health care intensity levels over the next half-century.
The once-and-for-all increase in taxing effort amounts to 4.5 per cent of GDP.
This estimate is sensitive to parameter choices but, even if alternate specifica-
tions generate a smaller required increase in taxing effort, the increase remains
substantial.
Pierre Fortin (2011) has recently conducted a similarly motivated exercise
to estimate the fiscal implications for Quebec of a shift in the age distribution
of the provincial population combined with the cohort-specific distribution of
provincial health expenditures. The impact by 2020 amounts to 1.7 per cent of
2010 provincial GDP. In addition, he estimates the decline by 2020 in own-
source Quebec tax revenue due to a smaller adult population ages 15-64
cohort at 1.6 per cent of 2010 GDP.4
Preserving the efficiency of a single-payer insurance system
As with the C/QPP, to rely on future pay-as-you-go increases in taxing
effort would simultaneously lower intergenerational equity and increase long-
term economic inefficiency. It would require an increase in pay-as-you-go tax-
ing effort during the peak decades of boomers’ frail elderly care well above the
levelized rate. It would also raise questions of fiscal credibility: will the work-
ing-age population agree in the decades of maximum boomer-cohort health
care to the pay-as-you go taxing effort consistent with the health benefits pres-
ently on offer?
One policy option is to relax the constraint on private health markets legis-
lated in the Canada Health Act and related provincial laws. The Supreme
Court’s Chaoulli decision defined a right to buy private health insurance based
4 Fortin estimates the age-induced increase in health care spending, by 2020
relative to 2010, at $5.1 billion, 1.7 per cent of 2010 GDP of $303.7 billion.
He estimates lost own-source revenue by 2020 relative to a counterfactual in
which the age 15-64 cohort increased from 2010 – 2020 at the same rate as
over the decade 2000 – 2010. The lost revenue estimate is $4.9 billion, 1.6 per
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on the “security of the person” provision of the Charter. This decision may
turn out to be precursor to a widespread choice of this option.5
Expansion of private health insurance can play a role in financing boomer
cohort frail elderly care, but is not a panacea. It is worth stating briefly the
equity and efficiency arguments for a single-payer insurance system continu-
ing to dominate the health market. The equity argument for funding health
care via a moderately progressive tax system is obvious. The efficiency argu-
ment depends on two effects. The first: maintaining a high level of population
health without the impediment to mobility and employment implicit in
employment-related insurance or needs-related conditional public subsidy
improves labour force productivity. The second effect is that single payer sys-
tems potentially avoid significant costs arising from information asymmetry
and other agency problems. Realizing the second effect rests ultimately on the
quality of public management: applying cost/utility criteria in making major
decisions (such as a list of drugs to include in a formulary of insured drugs) and
in designing “internal markets” (such as regulations defining the market for
ambulatory medical care). Most OECD countries have reasonable quality of
public management, and have realized substantial efficiency and equity gains
relative to the US history of relying primarily on voluntary private insurance
plus public funding for the old and indigent.
“Don’t let the health minister eat everyone else’s lunch”
A senior administrator – he would probably prefer not to be cited – has sum-
marized his observations of the past decade’s cabinet budget deliberations at
the provincial level: “when ministers gather to allocate revenues for new pro-
grams, the health minister eats everyone else’s lunch.” An example is the 2011-
12 budget of British Columbia (British Columbia Ministry of Finance, 2011,
p. 17). It estimated an increase in consolidated revenue fund spending of
nearly $1.1 billion between 2010-11 and 2011-12. The estimated increase in
health spending exceeds $900 million, leaving approximately $150 million for
5 For a discussion of the implications of Chaoulli, see the interviews with Allan
Blakeney and Patrick Monahan (Morley, 2006; Poschmann, 2006).234 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
all other agencies. This is a typical outcome of provincial cabinet delibera-
tions, repeated across the country since the end of the fiscal crisis of the 1990s.
That health care is absorbing the great majority of incremental provincial
spending does not prove that other spending envelopes should be funded more
generously. It is evidence of politicians’ acute sensitivity to spending priorities
of the baby boom cohort – and of a limited response to the case for incremen-
tal public spending elsewhere.6 Given their age, members of the cohort born
between 1945 and 1965 have an intense concern with relaxing the administra-
tive constraints that define public health expenditures: use of waiting lists for
elective surgery and access to expensive diagnostic services; imposition of co-
payments on pharmaceutical drug insurance, and so on. Their above-average
propensity to vote, relative to younger cohorts, augments the political salience
of their priorities.
Prodding the Hornet’s Nest
Shortly after the 2010 US midterm elections restored Republican control of
the House of Representatives, David Brooks (2011) forecast an aggressive
House-led campaign to maintain taxing effort prevailing in 2008 and to lower
spending to conform. He was right. The May 2011 general election generated
a somewhat similar result in Canada. A plurality of voters afforded a parlia-
mentary majority to the Conservatives who campaigned on maintaining Can-
ada’s “low tax advantage” and a promise to balance the federal budget by 2015
subject to current taxing effort. The implicit reference point for the “high tax
disadvantage” was Canadian taxing effort in the 1990s.
Public scepticism to claims for higher taxes is a healthy feature of any
democracy but, in both Canada and United States, political polarization has
elevated scepticism in the last decade – despite the fact that taxing effort
6 After health, the second largest spending envelope at the provincial level is
education. The OECD (2010b) undertook an exercise to estimate productivity
gains from reducing the high school dropout rate in member states. The exer-
cise measured the public and private returns to completion of upper level sec-
ondary studies (relative to not doing so). For Canada, the estimated private rate
of return to a student from completion is about 13 per cent, and the public
return about 7 per cent. Admittedly, the private and public returns on further
lowering of the high school dropout rate are no doubt lower than the OECD
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declined in both countries. In Canada, taxing effort declined from a level close
to the top quartile for OECD countries in late 1990s to a level close to the bot-
tom quartile in 2011. Similarly, government outlays in Canada declined from
a level close to the top quartile two decades ago; since 2008, they have closely
tracked the bottom quartile. As elsewhere in the OECD, Canadian outlays
rose as a share of GDP during the post-2008 recession but remained at the
bottom quartile. (See Charts 3 and 4.)
If we accept Robson’s parameters and modeling rationale and we assume no
cuts in share of GDP devoted to other programs, levelized prefunding of
boomers’ frail elderly care requires raising the Canadian taxing effort from its
39 per cent average since 2009 to about 43 per cent of GDP. This would return
Canada to levels prevailing in early years of the previous decade and close to
the projected OECD median for 2012. (See Chart 4.)
Chart 3
Government Outlays as Share of GDP, Quartiles for OECD Member 
States, Canada and United States, 1992 - 2012
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Beyond recent election outcomes, the World Values Survey (2011) affords
evidence to the effect that both Americans and Canadians have in the previous
decade been among the more adamant of citizens in OECD member states in
not wanting government to “do more” than at present. In its 2005-08 round,
respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement
with the following propositions: “People should take more responsibility to pro-
vide for themselves” and “the government should take more responsibility to
ensure that everyone is provided for.” Respondents could express complete agree-
ment with the first statement (scored at 10), compete agreement with the contrary
position (scored at 1), or degrees of (dis)agreement with each by choosing a num-
ber between 1 and 10. Chart 5 plots the average national scores among 17 OECD
member countries against the average taxing effort in the country over the decade
1999-2008.
Chart 4
Government Tax plus Non-Tax Revenues as Share of GDP, Quartiles for 
OECD Member States, Canada and United States, 1992 - 2012
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The 17 country scores range from 3.5 to 6.4. As to be expected, scores shift
toward “people taking more responsibility” at higher rates of taxing effort and,
mutatis mutandis, shift toward the opposite proposition at lower rates of tax-
ing effort. The Anglo-Saxon countries (US, Britain, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada) – and Switzerland – are outliers. At any given taxing effort, these
countries are significantly more inclined to conclude that people should be
taking more personal responsibility.
Arguably, the direction of causation should be inverted in the medium term
(extending over more than a decade): public opinion imposes a floor and ceil-
ing on the ability of democratically elected governments either to tax and
spend or not tax and not spend. Based on a crude regression across the 17
countries, a 4 percentage point increase in taxing effort might increase Can-
ada’s average score in a future survey from its present value of 6.0 to a value
Chart 5
National Public Expectations that Government Should Do Less or 
More, by Average Annual Ratio of Government Revenues/GDP, 
1999-2008
Source: author’s calculations from OECD (2010a) and World Values Survey (2011).238 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
between 6.2 and 6.3, placing it close to the apparent ceiling of public tolerance
for government “taking more responsibility.”7
Provincial and federal cabinet ministers are broadly aware of the implica-
tions of pay-as-you-go funding of the boomers’ frail elderly health care costs.
Nonetheless, based on the budgetary evidence, it is fair to conclude that most
subscribe to the conclusion that the preferred policy is to let health ministers
eat everyone else’s lunch. Prefunding amounts to an increase in taxing effort
and they are not prepared to prod the hornet’s nest of those opposed to higher
taxes. In lieu of prefunding, a sizeable minority of cabinet ministers at both
orders of government might well prefer to relax constraints limiting private
health insurance.
In the 2008 general election, the Liberals campaigned for a national carbon
tax. The result was their lowest-ever share of popular vote – until 2011. The
Liberals’ 2008 performance has generated a consensus across national political
parties on climate change policy equivalent to that surrounding boomers’
health care: to propose a carbon tax is to prod the hornet’s nest of public scep-
ticism toward tax change, and assure electoral defeat; safer to advocate emis-
sions trading at some time in the future, preferably sufficiently far in the future
that it not impinge on any forthcoming election campaign. In addition to the
precedent established by the Liberals’ 2008 election campaign, a combination
of events has lowered political pressure to act: international diplomatic stale-
mate, symbolized by the failure of the Copenhagen meeting in 2009; a few ill-
advised emails among climate scientists; and the public success of a handful of
climate-change sceptics. 
The Politics of a Carbon Tax
The government of Canada’s stated target for greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions reduction is that they fall 20 per cent below 2006 levels by 2020, and 65
per cent below 2006 levels by 2050. To realize these targets, modeling for the
7 The OLS results are as follows: y = 2.38 + 1.26x1 + 0.06x2, where y is the pre-
dicted national score, x1 is a dummy taking the value 1 for Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries (United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada) and 0 elsewhere;
x2 is average revenue / GDP over the decade 1999-2008. The adjusted R2 is
0.44; both regressors are significant at 0.025.New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada 239
latest report of the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Econ-
omy (NRTEE, 2009) envisions a carbon price of $100/tonne of CO2 equiva-
lent by 2020, rising to $200/tonne by 2025, combined with some international
purchase of carbon offsets. To realize the targets domestically, without inter-
national trading, would require a $300/tonne price. Maybe it should be treated
as no more than coincidence but, based on 2008 Canadian GHG emissions
and a carbon tax levied on major emitters responsible for 50 per cent of total
emissions, a tax of $200/tonne would raise 4.3 per cent of GDP, roughly Rob-
son’s prefunding target.8
While the odds are not – in the short run – good, there are two pragmatic
arguments that suggest grappling simultaneously with the case for prefunding
boomers’ health care and implementing a carbon tax may improve the chances
of success with both. First however is the Pigovian argument.
The Pigovian argument
A valid concern with any increase in taxing effort is the impact on marginal
effective tax rates (METRs). As opposed to prefunding via some other tax,
introducing a carbon tax improves the social efficiency of the tax system. As a
Pigovian tax, it addresses the divergence between private and social costs.
Imposition of a significant carbon tax obviously increases dramatically the pri-
vate METR of hydrocarbon-intensive activities, but do we want firms to invest
in projects based on a private METR, or consumers to make consumption
decisions based on prices that do not reflect GHG emissions?
A necessary condition for making the above argument is that we take into
consideration abatement benefits accruing to the 99.5 per cent of the world
population who are not Canadian. Is this simply altruism? No. Distributional
considerations figure prominently in the post-2009 stalemate in climate
change diplomacy. Developing countries, China and India in the lead, argue
that, because the already industrialized countries account for the great major-
ity of increase in atmospheric CO2 over the last two centuries, they should
8 While $200/tonne is roughly the carbon tax rate required to prefinance health
care given Robson’s parameter choice, there is no guarantee this remains true
in the future. If Canada does reduce GHG emissions, the rate would have to be
higher than $200 to meet the revenue target. 240 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
bear the brunt of the costs of reducing GHG emissions. Until they do so,
developing economies should continue with “business as usual.” Per capita
GHG emissions in Canada are the second highest among major industrial
countries, close behind the United States. They are three times that of China,
and ten times the comparable Indian statistic. Unblocking the stalemate in
international climate change diplomacy will inevitably require United States
and Canada to undertake far more ambitious climate change policy than either
country has displayed to date.9
Public opinion in British Columbia
The one major jurisdiction in North America to have introduced a signifi-
cant carbon tax on major emitters is British Columbia. Introduced in 2008,
the province’s carbon tax was subject to much partisan controversy. The NDP,
Official Opposition to the governing Liberals, opposed it – advocating instead
an emissions trading system to be implemented some time in the following
decade. In the 2009 provincial election, the NDP promised to repeal the tax.
The Liberals won re-election based, in part, on high-profile defections to the
Liberals from the Green Party. In a closely fought electoral contest, the move
toward the Liberals among many supporters of the Green Party probably pro-
vided the margin necessary for a Liberal plurality in the popular vote.10 In
April 2011, the Pembina Institute conducted a random opinion survey on cur-
rent attitudes in BC toward the carbon tax three years after implementation.
Several results are worth noting:
• “BC has taken several steps to address global warming (also known as ‘climate
change’). Do you think the current BC government’s approach is too tough, is not
9 For international GHG emission estimates see IEA (2010). In 2008, the top two
emitters, China and United States, jointly accounted for 40 per cent of total
emissions. The third through tenth – India ranks fourth and Canada seventh –
accounted for 25 per cent. The remaining countries accounted for the final 35
per cent.
10 The final vote distribution changed little between the 2005 and 2009 elec-
tions. The Liberal vote share remained unchanged at 45.8 per cent; the NDP
vote rose from 41.5 per cent to 42.2 per cent; the Green Party vote declined
from 9.2 per cent to 8.2 per cent. However, the Green Party support was con-
sistently at 13 per cent during the campaign, until the final week. Most of the
five-point decline in Green Party support probably benefited the Liberals.New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada 241
tough enough, or about right?” Fifty-two per cent responded “not tough
enough”, as opposed to 36 per cent who responded “about right”, and 13
per cent “too tough.”
• ”The carbon tax is applied to all fossil fuel combustion, but isn’t applied to other
sources of pollution that causes global warming like methane decomposing from
landfills or carbon dioxide being stripped from raw natural gas. Do you agree or
disagree that the carbon tax should be applied equally to all sources of pollution
that cause global warming?” Sixty-nine per cent “strongly” or “somewhat
agree”; 21 per cent neither agree nor disagree; 10 per cent “somewhat” or
“strongly disagree.”
• “Every year, the carbon tax has been increasing by $5/tonne, and the schedule
currently stops in 2012 when the tax will be $30/tonne. Do you think the carbon
tax should continue to increase after 2012 as part of BC’s efforts to reduce pollu-
tion?” A minority, 29 per cent, want the rate to continue to ramp up, as
opposed to 51 per cent opposed, and 21 per cent “don’t know.”
Table 1
“What are the Best Ways for Government to Collect Taxes?”
Source: author’s calculation from data in survey undertaken by Pembina Institute (Horne
2011).
Note: Respondents ranked each of five taxes in response to the following question: “The
provincial government needs to raise revenue to provide various services to British
Columbians, such as health care and education. Much of that revenue comes from taxes.
In your view, what are the best ways for government to collect taxes.” The rows indicate
distribution of ranks of each tax. The taxes are ranked based on a linear weighting.
rank 1st 2nd 3rd 4th/5th score
weight 3 2 1 0  (min=0,
(per cent) max=3)
corporate income tax 66.4 18.9 6.7 8.0 2.437
carbon tax 13.3 40.7 16.6 29.4 1.378
sales tax 11.9 14.1 32.2 41.8 0.961
property tax 3.6 12.9 24.6 58.9 0.612
personal income tax 4.8 13.3 19.6 62.3 0.606242 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
• “The provincial government needs to raise revenue to provide various services to
British Columbians, such as health care and education. Much of that revenue
comes from taxes. In your view, what are the best ways for government to collect
taxes.” Respondents were invited to rank three of five tax options. Scoring
the choices on a linear scale, carbon taxes emerged as the second most
desirable, admittedly far below corporate income taxes in popularity. (See
Table 1).
• “In the future BC’s carbon tax could generate more revenue than the $1.1 billion
currently forecast for 2012. For you, what would be the appropriate uses for any
new revenue from BC’s carbon tax?” Respondents were invited to check any
of five uses they thought “appropriate.” (See Chart 6.)
After three years, the tax has achieved widespread acceptance, ranking sec-
ond among preffered tax sources from which the government should obtain
revenue. However, ramping up the tax to a level consistent with prefunding

































“Appropriate Uses” for Incremental Carbon Tax Revenue
Source: Horne (2011).
Note: The survey posed the following question: “In the future BC’s carbon tax could generate
more revenue than the $1.1 billion currently forecast for 2012. For you, what would be
the appropriate uses for any new revenue from BC’s carbon tax?” Respondents chose as
many uses as they thought “appropriate” among the five options.New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada 243
It may be relevant that, of the options in Chart 6, spending on health care
and education ranked highest, above options reflecting a desire for revenue
neutrality. This suggests another parallel with C/QPP reform in the 1990s.
Canadians accepted a large increase in a payroll tax conditional on revenue
being earmarked for a consensual goal. No major political party has subse-
quently proposed rolling back the increase and resorting to pay-as-you-go
financing. Some of the opposition to the Liberals’ 2008 carbon tax proposals
can probably be explained by voter mistrust that the incremental revenue
would be dissipated in special interest projects, and that any promise of reve-
nue neutrality was not credible.
“Black-green” realpolitik
Many spokesmen for the oil and gas industry concede that international
public anxiety with respect to climate change is sufficient to derail or intermi-
nably delay large-scale Canadian hydrocarbon projects – including tar sands
expansion – unless there exists a substantial national emissions pricing policy.
A recent report published under the auspices of the Calgary Chamber of Com-
merce and the Canada West Foundation (Brunnen et al., 2011, p. 25) discusses
emissions pricing favourably. The report advocates “a national level carbon
strategy. This could take different forms such as a carbon tax, which would be
the most simple to implement.” The authors qualify endorsement of a carbon
tax by reference to “other options such as a regulatory approach with a perfor-
mance standard and multiple compliance options.” And industry leaders
would lobby that much of the revenue raised by a carbon tax be returned to the
sector in the form of R&D subsidy.
Among the executives acknowledging the case for pricing GHGs and
accepting a carbon tax as instrument is Michael Cleland, former head of the
Canadian Gas Association:
[Energy] prices should include environmental costs, 
including whatever cost society chooses to attribute to 
carbon. Carbon policy needs to come to grips with the 
politically fraught fact that the worst thing that can be 
done with carbon costs is to impose them and then try to 
hide them … [to] argue for cap and trade as a way of dis-
guising the fact that it is a tax. Consumers are smarter 244 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
than policy elites give them credit for. They will find out 
and they will punish deceivers. Just possibly, if we avoid 
trying to fool consumers and instead engage them we 
may be able to find ways forward that they will trust even 
if they don’t relish them. (Cleland , 2011)
The emergence of qualified support for a national carbon tax among oil and
gas executives affords an opening for environmental activists and governments
(NRTEE, 2009). A carbon tax is, as stated, “simple to implement” relative to
the alternative, emissions trading. From the perspective of firms calculating
net present value of hydrocarbon investments, an advantage of a carbon tax
over the “cap and trade” alternative is greater certainty of future costs. Trad-
ing in emissions permits has generated volatile prices. From the public per-
spective, a tax assures that revenue from addressing the GHG externality
accrue to the public, as opposed to private agents with market or political
advantage.11 In addition, collapse of many derivatives markets in 2008 has
dampened enthusiasm for trading complex contracts governing hypothetical
changes in hydrocarbon use.12
Implementation
Implementation of a prepayment scheme via an earmarked carbon tax is cer-
tainly feasible given our history of complex federal-provincial fiscal arrange-
ments. All revenues from a federal carbon tax should be credited to a medicare
“prepayment account”, to be managed at arm’s length from Parliament. The
account managers would become responsible for annual disbursements to
11 Launched in 2005, the largest functioning “cap and trade” market is the Euro-
pean Union Emission Trading System. Initially, EU governments issued too
many permits and the permit price collapsed. Control of the supply of permits
has tightened in recent years, but the market price remains subject to much
uncertainty over the range of emitters to which the system will apply and
schedule of permit supply in future years. At time of writing in July 2011, the
emissions permit price/tonne of CO2 is C$18 (Point Carbon, 2011), less than
the rate imposed by BC’s carbon tax. For a dispassionate assessment of imple-
menting a carbon tax vs emissions trading, see Price Waterhouse Coopers
(2009). An important advocacy group engaged in this debate is the Carbon Tax
Center (2011).
12 To appreciate the complexity of carbon trades, see the glossary of terms pre-
pared by Point Carbon (2011).New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada 245
provinces based on deviations from a population distribution that serves as
benchmark. A census, say that for 2011, could provide the data on provincial
population by age cohorts; subsequent censuses would provide data on provin-
cial cohort deviations from the benchmark distribution. The Canadian Insti-
tute for Health Information (CIHI) already estimates cohort-specific
provincial health expenditures. The managers of the account would accord-
ingly have available the data necessary to calculate provincial claims on the
account. Account managers would also be responsible for investing surpluses
generated in early years in the capital market. 
It is an understatement to acknowledge that implementation presents many
problems that the above sketch ignores. I conclude with brief mention of three.
Benefit creep
While politicians may precipitate a new C/QPP crisis by enlarging benefits
without equivalent tax adjustments, well defined benefit regulations provide
credibility to the program’s financial viability. No such administratively well
defined regulations exist to constrain health care benefits.
At present, the financial credibility of public health insurance programs
rests on public willingness to pay the required pay-as-you-go taxes, as inter-
preted by provincial and – to the extent Ottawa is prepared to share costs –
federal politicians. As medical technology improves and the age 65 and over
population share rises, there will be intense pressure to increase age-related
health benefits. If the age 65 and over cohort-specific health costs rise beyond
the provisions of the prefunding formula, then prefunding will not preempt
the need for future increases in pay-as-you-go taxes and/or abandonment of a
single-payer system.
The value of equalization
Provincial governments are the locus of most major policy decisions with
respect to health care. If a prefunding arrangement is to have any chance of
gaining credibility, the provinces must retain and strengthen a political/
administrative culture able to internalize both the costs and benefits of incre-
mental public spending. Equalization is crucial to that end. At various times in246 New Directions for Intelligent Government in Canada
the 2000s equalization was in danger of degenerating into a predetermined
entitlement for traditional “have not” provinces.13
In the words of the Constitution Act (s.36 (2)), “Parliament and the govern-
ment of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization pay-
ments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to
provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably compa-
rable levels of taxation.” Equalization is a valuable institution inasmuch as it
enables reconciliation of Canadians’ expectations of comparable services
across the country with tax-spending coincidence at the margin, and a form of
interregional insurance against regional economic shocks. It provides appro-
priate incentives for provincial politicians to internalize both the costs and
benefits of incremental public spending. In the context of health budgeting,
this entails health decisions based on pragmatic cost/utility considerations.
Pharmaceuticals
Ottawa has provided statements of principle (viz. the national standards of
the Canada Health Act) with respect to health insurance, and assumed roughly
a quarter of provincial expenditures via intergovernmental cash transfers.
Arguably, prefunding would be easier to implement and the quality of Cana-
dian public health management would improve, if federal officials became
more familiar with the complexities of health care management by themselves
assuming responsibility for elements of the system. The ideal candidate is
pharmaceutical policy. Already Ottawa plays a role: in undertaking clinical tri-
als on drugs and in legislating the extent of patent protection. Pharmaceuticals
are the most rapidly growing major component of health spending; they now
comprise about a sixth of provincial health costs, about 1.5 per cent of GDP.
As with other major health care envelopes, pharmaceutical use is skewed
toward older age cohorts.
13 Paul Martin’s ad hoc 2004 deal to allow Newfoundland to keep its equalization
allocations intact despite rising offshore oil royalties severely damaged the
program’s credibility. Al O’Brien’s report (Department of Finance, 2006) pro-
vided the basis for restoring credibility in the short run. However, equalization
continues to be subject to ad hoc federal amendments, and public understand-
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The present agreement governing Ottawa’s share of provincial health care
budgets was negotiated in 2004 for a period of ten years. At the time of nego-
tiation in 2004, the provinces proposed that Ottawa assume responsibility for
pharmacare, with the hope that Ottawa organize a national formulary, under-
take bulk purchasing of generic drugs, and standardize pharmaceutical insur-
ance on a national basis (Marchildon 2006). Ottawa refused the provincial
offer, preferring to transfer cash instead.
The provincial offer of 2004 still makes sense. Of all major health care com-
ponents, pharmaceuticals are the most likely to demonstrate scale economies
– in cost/utility evaluations necessary for formulary design, potential to exer-
cise market power in bulk purchasing, and so on. If Ottawa managed pharma-
ceutical policy, it should be eligible to draw from the prefunding account in
the same manner as the provinces.
Conclusion
In the current environment of public scepticism toward increased tax effort,
the above exercise is open to the charge of idle speculation. Writing in another
context (preserving the credibility of the euro), Larry Summers (2011) has
summarized the “art of economic policy making [as] reconciling the political
and the technical or arithmetic imperatives. You cannot move forward in dem-
ocratic nations without sufficient political support … But we ask our political
leaders not simply to take the preferences of their citizenry as a given.” Idle
speculation has its place. At a minimum, it invites advocates of particular agen-
das to address the politics of taxing, and to assess seriously the need for alli-
ances if they are to achieve goals that they are unlikely to realize alone. 
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